Reducing Communications
Mitigating a critical vulnerability of distributed operations
by Capt Christian Buchanan
In the tactical application of the distributed operations [DO] concept, it is envisioned that maneuver units will operate in a disaggregated fashion, with companies, platoons, and even squads dispersed beyond the normal range of mutually supporting organic direct fires, but linked through a command and control network.1
In fact, the DO communications network will be the conduit used to kill the enemy, mass forces, and understand the battlefield. Consequently, the network will have to be more flexible and deliver more services to lower echelons than ever before. In order to support DO, the last mile network supporting the DO unit directly will have to be a distributed network. However, the nature of the distributed battlefield will pose unique challenges and new requirements for the last mile communications network. In order to meet the challenges and requirements of distributed communications operations, the Marine Corps will need to invest in low-probability intercept and detection (LPI/D) wireless data technologies.
Figure 1.
Challenges of Communications for Distributed Operations
Critical vulnerability (CV) analysis. In order to achieve the
critical requirements of DO, the network must allow the DO unit to
communicate with higher and adjacent units while remaining hidden
from enemy sensors. Figure 1 shows the CV analysis and synthesized
critical requirements of DO communications using the critical capabilities
extracted from the Commandant’s concept paper.
Threat and threat counteraction analysis. Table 1 (shown below)
shows the enemy threats to DO and the counteractions that can be utilized
in DO networks.
LPI/D
Technologies. The counteraction that is effective against all
three enemy threats is the utilization of LPI/D transmissions. LPI/D
transmissions include transmissions utilizing directional antennas,
frequency hopping, low-power transmission, and burst transmission.
DO units could use all of these technologies. The more of these technologies
that are combined, the less likely an enemy is to be able to intercept
or detect communications.
Directional antennas have to be aimed at their target receivers. This
means that a mobile force would have great difficulty maintaining
communications on the move except in relatively flat terrain.
Frequency hopping, as used in the current SINCGARS family of radios,
is necessary to prevent jamming. Radios that use frequency hopping
transmit their signals sequentially over many different frequencies.
More importantly, they do not stay on any frequency long enough for
an enemy to jam the entire communications. However, in order to reduce
the data error rates to acceptable levels, the Marine Corps should
consider smart frequency hopping radios that are sensitive to ambient
spectrum use from the myriad of transmitters out there. Ambient transmitters
might include commercial (civilian) radios and garage door openers
or enemy radios on which the Marines want to avoid detectable interference.
Using low-power transmitters, like the Bluetooth headsets
used with cellular phones, also provides a low probability of detection.
Additionally, these devices decrease logistics requirements because
they are small and use few batteries. Unfortunately, low-power transmissions
have a very short range (hence the low probability of detection).
Still, this technology could be used for intrasquad communications
or to transmit to the DO unit’s vehicle.
Because
this vehicle would have a more durable power source and offer a more
stable platform for the use of directional antennas, it could then
relay the transmission using a larger transmitter.
Burst
transmission is the method of sending communications in very short
bursts that are not transmitted long enough for the enemy to lock
onto the signal. Like low-power transmission, burst transmission also
saves batteries. It also has the low probability of intercept advantages
of frequency hopping. However, burst transmission does not support
the voice communications that are so critical to combat operations.
Practical considerations. Having examined several countermeasures
to detection by enemy forces, some practical matters must be considered
before trying to select or create the required technologies. Weight,
power consumption, survivability, and usability are all key considerations
when selecting a technology to use for DO communications.
Weight and power consumption go hand in hand. Normally, the more power
radio uses, the larger the power source and components of that radio
need to be. As a rule of thumb, more power equals more weight. These
considerations are of concern for all of the components of the DO
network as they pertain to logistics. However, they also need to be
minimized primarily for dismounted operations to facilitate carrying
more chow, water, and ammunition.
Survivability is another consideration of the network. This consideration
does not refer to the survivability of the individual user but to
the survivability of the link by which the information travels. The
Internet is a good example of a survivable network because there is
no single point of failure on the Internet. While individual sites
on the Internet may be attacked or disabled, the network itself is
ubiquitous, redundant, and reliable.
The last consideration is usability. The DO unit leader will have
to master many of the warfighting skills now used by special operations
forces. The burden of using a complicated mechanism for communications
should not be added to the list. The interface to the communications
network should be either simple or familiar to reduce the training
requirements and should allow the DO unit leader to focus on the enemy.
Table 1.
Statement of requirement. The requirements for mitigating the
risk to DO communications follow:
..... •The system must be lightweight
for the end user, including the supporting logistics requirements.
......•The network should not have
a single point of failure once the message leaves the user.
......•The interface must be easy
to use or be familiar to the users.
......•The system must have a low
probability of intercept for the end user.
......•The system must use antijam
technology.
......•The system should use smart
spectrum technology to prevent interference with ambient devices.
......•The system should be so difficult
to destroy that it would not be worth the expense to an enemy.
......•The system should use NSA
certified Type I encryption.
The
requirements relative to the use of DO communications equipment follow:
......•The system must be capable
of on-the-move, over-the-horizon, and beyond line-of-site communications.
......•The system must allow the
DO commander and unit leader to maintain the common tactical picture.
......•The system must be able to
distribute actionable intelligence to the DO unit leader and pass
intelligence back to the DO commander.
......•The system must be able to
pass automated logistics data and interface with automated logistics
systems.
......•The system must be able to
maintain low-latency communications with fire support elements (such
as aircraft and artillery) and, if possible, have a direct sensor-to-shooter
link.
Technical solution. Several articles have touted the use of various
ground- and airbased vehicles to overcome the inherent challenges
of DO communications. These solutions overcome the line-of-sight issues
by using hybrid relay technologies or extending line of sight by gaining
altitude. The central problem with each of these is that they trade
one critical vulnerability for another. The vehicles become the critical
vulnerability because of their required proximity to the enemy forces.
To provide communications for DO without creating a critical vulnerability,
the network itself must be so difficult to destroy that it would not
be worth the effort for an adversary to directly attack it. While
spacebased systems offer a “hard point” defense, they were
conceived to support division-level forces and are too expensive to
be employed at the squad level. The network components that are within
range of enemy sensors and indirect fire assets must be distributed
over the battlefield in sufficient density to support operations but
dispersed to avoid compromising the network in the event of a direct
or electronic attack.
In order to be most effective, the DO communications network should
complement the DO concept of disaggregated maneuver elements. Only
a data network can pass all of the types of information required by
DO. Because none of the primary wireless data communications technologies
used today can support DO alone, a new or hybrid technology will be
needed. The DO network should consist of small, disposable routers
linked by a hybrid radio gateway to long-haul communications systems.
Whether using the joint tactical radio system wideband networking
waveform or commercially available standards, these routers should
be small, lightweight, rugged, and cheap.
Once developed, the routers could be scattered by a variety of delivery
systems. They could be delivered by aviation or artillery. They could
be aboard small unmanned aircraft systems or dropped like breadcrumbs
by the DO squads themselves. The net effect would be to create a web
of interconnected routers that is as ubiquitous, redundant, and reliable
as the Internet for the DO unit. When the signal is relayed beyond
the range of enemy sensors or indirect fire weapons, the signal could
then by transmitted by a hybrid radio gateway like the CONDOR.
The CONDOR is a transit case system that can relay terrestrial
data and voice communications to a spacebased system such as the international
marine/maritime satellite or another terrestrial radio network. This
capability to relay voice or data traffic between disparate transmission
systems is a huge leap forward for command and control on the modern
battlefield. In the short term, CONDOR can link widely dispersed headquarters
elements via spacebased radio networks, but the real utility of the
system is its basic function to provide a gateway for disparate radio
networks. This capability gives the Marine Corps the ability to tie
in with any other joint or coalition radio nets using whatever radio
system is best for the Marine Corps. Eventually, CONDOR could be placed
in DO vehicles to bridge the long haul and the LPI radio nets together
in a flexible and affordable package. As these radio technologies
improve, the modular nature of the CONDOR platform and the inherent
capability to bridge disparate networks ensure that these new technologies
can be inserted into the system efficiently.
Summary
DO
represents a fundamental change in the tasks of the frontline Marine
and, therefore, a fundamental change in the tools required. The communications
network must be equally distributed and equally flexible. Developing
the DO network capabilities are central to the flexibility required
to meet the Marine’s most basic mission “as the President
may direct.”2
Notes
1. A Concept for Distributed Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Headquarters Marine Corps, 25 April 2005, p.2.
2. National Security Act of 1947.>Capt Buchanan wrote this article while a student at Expeditionary Warfare School. He was formerly the tactical data network project officer and is currently serving as the operations officer for satellite communications systems at Marine Corps Systems Command.
