Editorial: An Issue of Issues
There are two distinct and disparate issues brought to the forefront among the articles in this month’s Gazette. Both are issues that surfaced in award-winning essays entered in the MajGen Harold W. Chase Prize Essay Contest sponsored by the Gazette.
The first article, “Bridging the Gap,” by GySgt Richard Choquette, appears on page 22. In his article he compares the training and education of an infantry platoon commander to the training and education of an infantry platoon sergeant. The author was in a unique position to observe the disparity, as he is an instructor at the Infantry Unit Leader Course as well as a graduate of the Infantry Officer Course. His comparison is not flattering, and he makes a strong case that the training of the platoon sergeant must be enhanced and of at least the same caliber as that of his lieutenant. He makes the argument that we are on the right path in training the “strategic corporal” but have neglected to advance the training of the key connecting file in the infantry platoon—the platoon sergeant. His article was selected as the first place winner by the Gazette editorial board.
I know his article will raise some hackles, particularly among senior SNCOs. He raises valid issues and a problem that has to be solved institutionally. A superbly trained platoon sergeant is as important to the success of a platoon in combat as are superbly trained squad leaders and a skilled platoon commander. Every Marine may be a rifleman, but not every SNCO is an infantry platoon sergeant. Attendance at the SNCO Academy does not a competent infantry platoon sergeant make. The disparity in training and education between the infantry lieutenant and the platoon sergeant is a gap that must be closed.
Also included in this month’s issue is a provocative article that brings to the forefront the tendentious debate concerning the Marine special operations company (MSOC) and its relationship or, some would argue, nonrelationship with the MEU. In the Chase second place winning article on page 50, “MEU Plus MSOC: Trying to keep the SOC in MEU(SOC), Col “Sam” Mundy and Maj Robert Sotire probe the command relationships between the MEU, the MSOC, and the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC). This is a relationship that is just evolving, yet they point out some of the rough spots encountered and propose some alternative command relationships. The command and control authority that the TSOC has over the MSOC has impacted the MEU and perhaps worked to suboptimize the capabilities that the entire MEU plus MSOC can bring to the theater in general and the TSOC in particular. If this relationship does not evolve in the right direction we run the risk of the MSOC being viewed by embarked Marine units as just some ship riders who take away rack space, cube, and square from the embarkation plan and bring no value to us in return. That would not be good for the MEU, the MSOC, or the Marine Corps.
