The Security Cooperation MAGTF
Optimizing the regionalization of Marine forces for building partner capacity
by Maj Edward W. Novack
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| A regional focus and building partner capacity at all levels will be important missions for the SC MAGTF (Photo by SSgt Ricardo Morales.) |
>Maj Novack is an infantry officer currently serving as a regional plans officer at Strategy and Plans Division, Department of Plans, Policies, and Operations, HQMC.
In his forward to Send in the Marines: A Marine Corps Operational Force Employment Concept for an Uncertain Security Environment, the Commandant stated:
The Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force will challenge some long-standing practices within the Marine Corps. Among these changed practices is the implementation of a regional focus for units that source this new capability. Through this initiative, changes to manpower policies will enable the development of linguistically adept, culturally aware units for training foreign military forces across the globe.1
The Marine Corps will always maintain the ability to answer any contingency in any clime or place. However, the demands of the long war require the introduction of a new capability provider that is specifically task organized for security cooperation and civil-military relations—the Security Cooperation Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SC MAGTF). As the Commandant has indicated, the SC MAGTF will be different from how other MAGTFs are currently organized, trained, and equipped. One of the more revolutionary, contentious, and misunderstood features of the SC MAGTF is the regional focus that will be adopted by the units that source it.
The purpose of this article is to examine the issue of regionalization and how to create an effective, regionally focused SC MAGTF. This article will further seek to dispel some of the misconceptions about regionalization and demonstrate that, far from a detractor to full-spectrum operational readiness, regionalization will actually prove to be a potent combat multiplier that provides the regional combatant commanders with highly proficient, full-spectrum capable forces.
Implementing Regionalization
Two components are necessary to implement a regional focus for the SC MAGTFs. The first component is to source the MAGTF with units that have operational experience in the country or region. The second is to augment the staffing of these units with Marines who possess an indepth understanding of the environment. The first component will lead to more knowledgeable Marines based on individual experiences but will not provide a framework for contextualizing those experiences. Conversely, Marines with an academic or experiential understanding of a country or region may not be able to bridge the potential gap between a theoretical understanding or acute cultural awareness with the necessary operational understanding to be effective. The two components of regionalization need to be implemented together.
Operational experience will be best achieved by having the same units sourced for the SC MAGTF on a rotational basis.2 Over time the experiences of these units will be cumulative and support the creation of a solid knowledge base for themselves and their adjacent units. For example 2d Marine Regiment might be assigned as the Africa regiment for the Marine Corps. 1st Battalion, 2d Marines (1/2) would provide the ground combat element (GCE) for the SC MAGTF, rotating with 2/2 and 3/2 to support building partner capacity (BPC) missions across the African Continent. Similar rotations might be implemented for the elements that comprise the composite detachment and combat logistics element that support the GCE. As necessary, the higher headquarters of these units could even augment the deploying SC MAGTF elements.
Over time the operational experience of the SC MAGTF will compound. Assuming that an average enlistment affords a Marine the opportunity to deploy twice with his battalion on a 1:2 or 1:3 deployment-to-dwell rotation cycle, the SC MAGTF should always be sourced with personnel at least 40 percent of whom have experience with the mission. These seasoned trainers will in turn provide the model for the next generation of trainers.
Augmenting this growth in operational experience should be the assignment of regional specialists to the units that source the SC MAGTF. The implementation of this second component of regionalization will potentially require some greater changes and shifts in resources than the previous initiative. Indeed the initiatives offered below may require significant changes in the way we utilize some of the already existing capabilities in the Marine Corps.
The first initiative to provide the appropriate operational experience to the SC MAGTF is through the assignment of officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) with appropriate career Marine regional studies regions to the appropriate units that source the SC MAGTF. The purpose of the Career Marine Regional Studies Program (CMRSP)3 is to instill a greater appreciation and understanding for regional awareness through the assignment of 1 of 17 regional studies areas to every graduate of The Basic School and the Sergeants Course. Following the assignment of their respective “microregion,” the officers and NCOs are directed to learn as much as possible about cultural, social, political, and linguistic elements of the region.
Currently, microregion assignment does not correspond with duty station assignments. It is recognized that trying to make assignments completely conditional upon microregion assignment is unrealistic; however, a percentage should be achievable. By con centrating regional expertise through the CMRSP in specific units, a synergistic effect can be achieved that enables Marine leaders with the same or similar microregional assignments to be able to study together and develop greater language proficiency than if they were assigned to units where leaders with similar microregion assignments were not present. This plan will still allow the original intent of the program to be achieved by providing a diverse pool of regional experts across the greater Marine Corps.
The next initiative for providing regional expertise to SC MAGTF sourcing units could come through the assignment of foreign area officers (FAOs) and regional affairs officers (RAOs) to SC MAGTF units. Currently FAO and RAO expertise is recognized through the assignment of an additional military occupational specialty (AMOS) to an officer who either completes graduate-level education in regional security studies (for FAOs, demonstration of linguistic expertise is also required) or through the acknowledgement of previous experience that warrants the assignment of a particular FAO/RAO AMOS.4 Because the FAO/RAO MOS is an AMOS, it is not intended to be a primary job assignment. First and foremost, FAOs and RAOs need to maintain proficiency in their primary MOSs to remain competitive for advancement.
Currently, FAO and RAO assignments are billet coded to only a limited number of tables of organization (T/Os) and are exclusively at higher headquarters. However, for a regionally focused SC MAGTF, access to FAOs and RAOs would be a tremendous force multiplier. Selected billets in the units that are sourced for the SC MAGTF could be billet coded for FAOs or RAOs. Through billet coding, a specific line number on a T/O is identified as being appropriate for a specific AMOS.
When a line number is identified, the AMOS assignment is identified as either necessary or desired. If identified as necessary, the primary MOS monitor responsible for filling that T/O line number cannot assign an officer unless he has the necessary AMOS. If identified as desired, it provides the monitor with the ability to assign priority to an officer who holds both the primary MOS and AMOS over someone who only holds the primary MOS without limiting his flexibility to fill billets.
An additional benefit of billet coding specific line numbers on a T/O for FAOs or RAOs is that a better career progression for officers holding these AMOSs is achieved. A challenge facing officers who decide to become FAOs or RAOs is the impact that decision has on their opportunities to build and maintain primary MOS credibility. Since FAO/RAO billets are exclusively assigned to higher headquarters T/O, these officers frequently miss critical primary MOS experience, which results in them failing selection for promotion. By providing operational experience to FAOs and RAOs where they can serve in their primary MOSs, a more competitive career progression is permitted.
The last proposal for facilitating regional expertise to the SC MAGTF is to assign priority for permanent change of station orders to personnel seeking to be assigned to SC MAGTF units to personnel who have previously served there. When possible, personnel who have served with a specific SC MAGTF should be encouraged to return.
This proposal does not suggest that personnel who serve with SC MAGTF sourcing units should be forced to return—if they desire to serve in other units they should be permitted to do so—only that a seasoned NCO or officer with previous experience training foreign security forces in the region would be a tremendous asset to Marine Corps BPC efforts.
Together, the combined effects of recurrent unit rotation to the same area of responsibility and assignment of personnel with regional understanding and experience to the units that are sourced for the SC MAGTF should see a portion of our general-purpose forces well positioned to meet the challenges of this persistent mission. Critics to regionalization certainly abound. This concept constitutes a fundamental paradigm shift that entails steps that will challenge several conventionally held viewpoints.
What Regionalization Is Not
Regionalization does not reflect any changes in the training that the units that source the SC MAGTF will conduct. Infantry platoons will still conduct the basics of “blocking and tackling.” Infantry companies will still integrate and coordinate platoon maneuver for such operations as company attacks, raids, patrolling, and defense operations. Infantry battalions will still go to conduct combined arms training aimed at keeping the battalion capable of missions across the full range of military operations.
Concern has been expressed that regionalization for the units that source the SC MAGTF will see the advent of training requirements that degrade the full-spectrum combat capability of these units. As indicated above, from the battalion level on down, the mission essential task list will change very little. Regionalization should not entail significant additional training. The regional specialists should provide the necessary expertise to effectively implement training programs. Conversely, large amounts of time should not be spent providing a detailed environmental understanding to everyone. For the majority of the junior Marines, this understanding will come from on the ground experience. Basic training courses in cultural awareness and security cooperation techniques should be provided by the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) and Security Cooperation Education Training Center, but seeking to make everyone an expert is both a detractor and unnecessary.
Some opponents to regionalization express concern that the units that regularly rotate to support the SC MAGTF will become less focused on warfighting and, therefore, less proficient in the skills needed to be successful. This is a concern that is likely overstated. The fact is that the Marines who will be training and conducting BPC activities with our partner-nation security forces will have to be trainers and subject matter experts on tactics themselves.
This puts the onus on the small unit leaders to really know their stuff and, moreover, to be able to demonstrate their abilities and knowledge. The tactics themselves will likely not be that different—there are only so many ways to conduct an attack or organize a defense. Combined arms remains the best way to defeat an opponent and will be a cornerstone of any instruction that our Marines provide. Far from atrophying, the combat skills of the Marines who comprise the SC MAGTF should only grow in proficiency. This proficiency, combined with their indepth understanding of regional environmental factors, should see the SC MAGTF providing the regional combatant commander with some of his most potent combat forces.
Lastly, the concern that regionalization will result in units that can’t be globally sourced is unfounded. The units that source the SC MAGTF can still be considered available for regional operation plans both within and outside the geographic region in which they usually operate. As the Marine Corps conducts BPC activities that enable partner-nation security forces to effectively deal with internal security challenges, we can count on adversaries to still challenge us.
When this happens, it is simply a reflection of the complex security environment in which we live. Operations that require Marines to seize the initiative and dominate the enemy will still invariably occur despite our best efforts to minimize them. Regionalization will at least help Marines to minimize the conditions that lead to conflict while helping our forces to fight smarter. If the Marine Corps Mid-Range Threat Assessment 2005–2015 is accurate, future conflicts will likely be in areas where the SC MAGTFs will be operating. Regionalization will provide our Corps with at least one ready Marine expeditionary brigade-sized MAGTF that understands these regions and is optimized for operations there.
Conclusion
The present-day security environment differs greatly from that of the Cold War, yet some believe we can still organize and train our Marine forces as if we are facing the same threats. Critics invariably cite the rise of near-peer competitors as a reason for continuing to organize and deploy our general-purpose forces in a manner that sees them as generic plug-and-play pieces in a high-spectrum war. This article does not seek to refute the idea of the potential rise of near-peer competitors or the requirement to prepare for high-spectrum combat.
Regionalizing specific units for BPC activities does not mean they will not be capable of high-spectrum operations. However, the probability of a high-spectrum war in the near future is significantly lower than the current threat posed by unstable regions from which irregular and hybrid threats emerge. Accepting some risk to address the irregular threat is both necessary and the right thing to do.
Some critics have even gone so far as to state that if we tailor Marine forces for operations along the lower end of the spectrum we risk losing resources programmatically over the program objective memorandum cycle. I believe these critics have this argument reversed. If we do not begin to take measures to optimize Marine general-purpose forces as the most relevant and applicable to the current threat, we most certainly risk seeing our Service marginalized as an anachronism waiting for a threat that may never emerge.
The competition for money within the Department of Defense is intense and will get worse. The dollars generally go to the Service that provides the most relevant solution to the most proximate threat. The Marine Corps must position itself to face the most likely threat. We cannot become a “break glass in time of war” force that waits for the next island-hopping campaign or another DESERT STORM. We are at war now, and the threat is real. The irregular opponent is here today, and we need to organize, train, and equip at least part of our Corps to face what will invariably be a very long war.
Failure to do so may mean money and force structure reductions, but more importantly, it means we will not be prepared when our Nation needs us most. Regionalizing selected Marine forces is part of the solution. The initiatives proposed in this article, and others not yet thought of or expressed, should be critically examined in order to optimize our Corps to face our most likely threat.
Notes
1. Headquarters Marine Corps, Send in the Marines: A Marine Corps Operational Employment Concept for an Uncertain Security Environment, Washington, DC, January 2008, Forward. Available at www.mca-marines.org/
gazette/send.
2.Unit deployments are determined and assigned by the Marine Corps Bulletin 3120 promulgated by Marine Forces Command.
3. This course was created by CAOCL at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command in 2006.
4. Marine Corps Order 1520.11E, International Affairs Officer Program, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 21 December 2000.
